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The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty: Regional Autonomy Versus
International Law and Politics
MATTHEW LIPPMAN*

Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing the
power to make great decisions for good and evil. The unleashed
power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of
thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe

. . .

a

new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive and move
toward higher levels.I
Removing the threat of a world war-a nuclear war-is the most
acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted
with a choice: we must halt2 the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 6, 1985, the thirteen independent and self-governing
states which are South Pacific Forum members adopted the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty. 3 Parties to the Treaty
renounce the manufacturing, acquisition and possession of nuclear ex*

Matthew Lippman is an Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, at the

University of Illinois at Chicago. He received a B.A. from American University, a M.A. from
Northwestern University, a Ph.D. from Northwestern University, a J.D. from American University and a LL.M. from Harvard University.
1. Albert Einstein quoted in Aldridge & Stark, Nuclear War, Citizen Intervention, and
the Necessity Defense, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 326 (1986).
2. Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament,
G.A. Res. S-10/2, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 4) at para. 18, U.N. Doc. A/5-10/4 (1978),
reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1016 (1978).
3. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, adopted Aug. 6, 1985, 29 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter South Pacific Treaty].
The members of the South Pacific Forum include Australia (and its territories), Cook
Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu, New Zealand (and its territories), Naru, Niue, Papua New
Guinea, Soloman Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Western Samoa. Chesneaux, France in the Pacific: Global Approach or Respect for Regional Agendas?, 18 BULL. CONCERNED ASIAN
SCHOLARS 73 n. 1 (Apr.-June 1986); see generally, Fry, The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone:
Significance and Implications, 18 BULL. CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 61 (Apr.-June, 1986).
The boundaries of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone extend from the zone of application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in the east to
Australia's west coast in the west. The southern boundary is the Antarctic zone, while the
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plosive devices;4 agree to abide by safeguards in the provision of nuclear material and equipment;5 undertake to prevent the stationing of
any nuclear explosive device on their territory; 6 and agree not to
dump radioactive wastes and materials at sea anywhere within the
7
SPNFZ.
This Article reviews the political background and provisions of
the SPNFZ Treaty. It concludes by arguing that the Treaty has a
number of shortcomings which, when combined with the opposition
of the major western powers, are likely to limit the Treaty's
effectiveness.
II.

NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE PACIFIC

Since World War II ended, the South Pacific has been a major
equator forms the northern boundary with some extension to include Kiribati in the north. Id.
at 63. This is the area bounded by a line:
1. commencing at the point of intersection of the Equator by the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea;
2. running thence northerly along that maritime boundary to its intersection by the
outer limit of the exclusive economic zone of Papua New Guinea;
3. thence generally north-easterly along that outer limit to its intersection by the
Equator;
4. thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude
163 East;
5. thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 3
degrees North;
6. thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude
171 degrees East;
7. thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 4
degrees North;
8. thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude
180 degrees East;
9. thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;
10. thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude
165 degrees West;
11. thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 5
degrees 30 minutes North;
12. thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude
154 degrees West;
13. thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;
14. thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude
115 degrees West;
15. thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude
60 degrees South;
16. thence west along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude
115 degrees East ....
South Pacific Treaty, supra this note, Annex 1.
4. Id. art. 3.
5. Id. art. 4.
6. Id. art. 5.
7. Id. art. 7.
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atomic testing site. Between 1946 and 1958 the United States exploded sixty-six nuclear devices in Bikini and Enewetak atolls resulting in the destruction of six of the Marshall Islands and rendering
others uninhabitable due to irradiation.8 Over forty other United
States nuclear tests were carried out at Christmas Island in the midPacific. 9

During 1953 and 1957, Great Britain conducted major tests in
South Australia; including seven at Maralinga and two at Emu
Field.' 0 Between 1952 and 1957, three bombs were detonated at
Monte Bello Islands, eighty kilometers off the northwest coast of
Western Australia." In 1957, three bombs were also exploded at
Malden Island followed by six tests on the Christmas Islands in
1958.12 Additionally, Great Britain conducted numerous minor
atomic tests in Australia during the early 1960's.'1
French Polynesia has been the site of 115 French atomic atmospheric tests 14-initiated by a 120 kiloton blast on September 11,
1966. I5 A total of forty-two tests occurred at Moruroa and at Fangataufa, 1,500 kilometers from Tahiti. 16 Beginning in 1975, France
began a series of underground tests at Moruroa 17 and as of April
1986, it had conducted seventy-one underground tests in Polynesia.18
Since the end of World War II, the United States, Great Britain
and France have tested 250 nuclear bombs in the Pacific.1 9 The Pacific has provided a distant laboratory in which bombs have been
tested with little public attention and few major political ramifica8.

Introduction to the Issue, 18 BULL. CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 3, 9 (Apr.-June

1986).
9.

P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W. BELLO, AMERICAN LAKE NUCLEAR PERIL IN THE

PACIFIC 240 (1986).
10.

R. MILLIKEN, No CONCEIVABLE INJURY IX (1986).

11.
12.
13.

Id. at IX, 41.
Id. at XI.
Id. at 238-80.

14. B. DANIELSSON & M. DANIELSSON, POISONED REIGN FRENCH NUCLEAR COLONIALISM IN THE PACIFIC XVII (2d ed. 1986).
French Polynesia comprises five archipelagos, the Society Islands, Tuamotu Archipelago,
Marquesas Islands, the Mangareva and Austral Islands. Id. at 10. There are 130 islands
spread over a surface almost as extensive as Europe. Id. at 172.
15. Id. at 102.
16. Id. at 59, 205, 213.
17. See id. at 204-05.
18. Introduction to the Issue, supra note 8, at 9.
19. The Pacific: A New Stage For War?, BULL. OF THE AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM.
DISARMAMENT PROGRAM 3 (1987).
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tions.20 The people of the Pacific, until relatively recently, have not
been informed of the complete results, consequences and dangers of
nuclear tests.2 1 Journalist Robert Milliken notes that if the nuclear
powers and their allied governments in the Pacific "had been as frank
with the public as it now seems clear they should have been, the whole
nuclear testing program could well have ground to a halt. Secrecy
and public reassurance thus became primary tools of governments
and their scientific advisors .... ,,22
The full impact of atmospheric testing on humans still remains
uncertain. 23 It appears that "[r]adiation can have three main types of
effect on people: acute, long term and genetic. The acute and longterm impacts together are known as somatic effects because they relate to the effect on the body of a living person. Acute effects result
from heavy exposure to radiation. ' 24 Those effects include nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea, cramps, weight loss, fatigue, sweat, fever, headaches, skin burns and hair loss.2 5 Death from acute radiation can oc26
cur up to two months following exposure.
A high threshold of exposure is required for acute radiation, but
even a small dose can result in long-term effects such as cancer, leukemia and eye cataracts-and can cause genetic damage that is trans27
mitted to future generations.
The United State's first large thermonuclear device (Bravo) was
detonated in March 1954.28 The fifteen megaton weapon (750 times
more powerful than Hiroshima) produced heavy fallout almost 200
kilometers downwind from ground zero, on the inhabited atolls of
Uterik, Rongerik and Rongelap. The islanders were evacuated two
days following the test, but by then many had received skin burns and
20. B. DANIELSSON & M. DANIELSSON, supra note 14, at 195.
21. R. MILLIKEN, supra note 10, at XIV, 92-93.
22. Id. at 313. The same secrecy and lack of information characterized atmospheric nuclear testing conducted in the United States prior to 1963. See Allen v. United States, 588 F.
Supp. 247, 404 (C.D. Utah 1984).
23. Prior to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43,
362 atmospheric tests were conducted: 193 by the United States, 142 by the Soviets, 21 by the
British and 6 by the French. It is established that this resulted in 84,500 cancer deaths and up
to 168,000 genetic effects, 7,200 of which are considered serious. R. MILLIKEN, supra note 10,
at 283.
24. Id. at 289.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 290.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 291.
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were subject to vomiting and diarrhea. More than sixty-five percent
of those on Rongelap who were under age ten at the time of the explosion underwent surgery to remove thyroid cancers caused by iodine
ingested through water. 29 Eighteen of the nineteen children who received one-thousand-rad thyroid doses from United States hydrogen
bomb tests died.3 0 In the four years following the explosion, women
exposed to the Bravo test had a miscarriage and stillbirth rate more
31
than twice that of unexposed Marshall Island women.
French nuclear explosions in the Pacific between 1966 and 1972
caused widespread fall-out and resulted in "measurable concentrations of radio-nuclides in foodstuffs and in man and have, therefore,
resulted in additional radiation doses to persons living in that hemisphere and in Australia in particular. '3 2 The Australian government
alleged in the early 1970's that the people of the Pacific have and will
"pay with their lives for France's decision, in the face of constantly
expressed disapprobation by world public opinion, to commence and
' 33
to continue atmospheric nuclear weapon tests."
The French tests became a point of controversy in April 1973
when the Pacific Forum 34 issued a joint declaration in which "they
reaffirmed their strong opposition to these tests which exposed their
people as well as their environment to radioactive fall-out, against
their wishes and without benefit to them which demonstrated
deplorable indifference to their future well-being."' 35 Countries in
Latin America, 36 Africa 37 and Asia 38 also condemned the tests.
The French refused to cease atmospheric testing or even to provide the dates or expected size and yield of the explosions.3 9 On May
9, 1973, Australia 4° and New Zealand 41 separately instituted proceed29.

Id. at 291-92.

30. H. WASSERMAN & N. SOLOMON, KILLING OUR OWN THE DISASTER OF AMERICA'S
EXPERIENCE WITH ATOMIC RADIATION 86 (1982).
31. R. MILLIKEN, supra note 10, at 292.

32. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. Pleadings para. 46, at 13 (Judgment of Dec.
20, 1974).
33. Id. at 166, 178 (argument of Sen. Murphy, Counsel for the Government of Australia).
34. Attended by the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Western Samoa
and Tonga and the Premier of the Cook Islands, with the Chief Minister of Papua New Guinea
and the leader of the Niue present as observers. Id. para. 2, at 365.
35. Id.
36. Id. paras. 6-10, at 367-69.
37. Id. paras. 11-13, at 369-70.
38. Id. paras. 14-17, at 370-71.
39. Id. para. 18, at 6-7.
40. See generally id.
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ings against France in the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.).
The court voted eight to six to grant interim protective measures
in both the Australian 4 2 and the New Zealand 4 3 applications. The
court elaborated upon its reasoning in the Australian case, noting that
France had carried out atmospheric tests and planned to carry out
additional tests in the future. 44 These nuclear tests, according to the
court, have and will continue to cause lasting damage by depositing
wide-spread and measurable radioactive fall-out on Australian territory and elsewhere. The court noted that:
any radio-active material deposited on Australian territory will be
potentially dangerous to Australia and its people and any injury
caused thereby would be irreparable; that the conduct of French
nuclear tests in the atmosphere creates anxiety and concern among
the Australian people; ...[that] any effects of the French nuclear
tests upon the resources of the sea or the conditions of the environment can never be undone and would be irremediable by any payment of damages; and any infringement by France of the rights of
Australia and her people to freedom of movement over the high
seas and superjacent airspace cannot be undone . . .45
The I.C.J. ordered that neither Australia nor France should undertake action which "might aggravate or extend the dispute ... or
prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of the carrying out of
whatever decision the Court may render . . .and, in particular, the
French Government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of
radioactive fall-out on Australian territory ....,,46
In its final judgment of December 20, 1974, the I.C.J. took notice
of public statements by French authorities expressing their intent to
cease atmospheric nuclear tests following the conclusion of the 1974
41. See generally Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. (Judgment of Dec. 20, 1974).
42. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, 106 (Interim Protection Order of June
22, 1973).
43. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 142 (Interim Protection Order of June
22, 1973).
44. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 104, paras. 25-26.
45. Id. para. 27.
46. Id. at 106. See also Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 142 para. 36. The decisions were decided under Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice stating:
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the
respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith
be given to the parties and to the Security Council.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1976 U.N.Y.B. 1052, art. 41.
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series.47 The court determined that in announcing that the 1974 tests
would be the final series, France had satisfied the claims of both Australia 48 and New Zealand. 49 The court considered these statements
legally binding on France to halt atmospheric testing50 and it ruled
that there was "no reason to allow the continuance of proceedings
which it knows are bound to be fruitless. While judicial settlement
may provide a path to international harmony in circumstances of conflict, it is none the less true that the needless continuance of litigation
is an obstacle to such harmony." 5'
Although abandoning atmospheric tests, since 1975 France has
conducted underground nuclear tests in Polynesia. 52 The Pacific is
also used as a missile testing range by the United States5 3 and, to a
54
limited extent, the Soviet Union.
A.

Militarization of the Pacific

United States nuclear strategy is based upon a limited nuclear
war, involving a series of nuclear exchanges, which either may end in
a cease fire or escalate into a full-scale nuclear war. 55 A component of
this strategy is "horizontal escalation"-the ability to initiate a nuclear exchange on various regional fronts in order to strain Soviet mil56
itary resources.
Part of this strategy is to aggressively expand and deploy the
United States' Seventh Fleet on the Southern Soviet coast. 57 Peter
Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky and Walden Bello observe that "[t]he Seventh
Fleet's forward deployed surface ships increased by almost 100 per
47. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267, para. 41 (Judgment of Dec. 20,
1974); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472, para. 44 (Judgment of Dec. 20, 1974).
48. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 270, para. 52.
49. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 475, para. 55.
50. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 269-70, para. 51; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v.
Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 474-75, para. 53.
51. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 271, para. 58.
The nuclear test cases are reviewed in Comment, The InternationalCourt of Justice, the
Nuclear Test Cases: Judicial Silence v. Atomic Blasts, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 614 (1975); Keith,
The Nuclear Tests Cases after Ten Years, 14 V.U.W.L.R. 345 (1975); Kos, Interim Relief in
The InternationalCourt:New Zealand and the Nuclear Test Cases, 14 V.U.W.L.R. 357 (1975).
52. See generally B. DANIELSSON & M. DANIELSSON, supra note 14.
53. P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W. BELLO, supra note 9, at 240-50.
54. Id. at 326.
55. F. KNELMAN, REAGAN, GOD, & THE BOMB: FROM MYTH TO POLICY IN THE NuCLEAR ARMS RACE 23-25 (1985).
56. P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W. BELLO, supra note 9, at 124-26.
57. See id. at 129-31.
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cent between 1980 and 1983, from twenty-one to forty;" the United
States' warship strength in the Western Pacific (including missile and
attack submarines) rose from thirty-seven to fifty-two; and naval personnel afloat in the Pacific increased from 15,000 to 34,000.58 In total, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) commands 320,000
Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force personnel and a fleet, which will
include 300 ships by 1988.59
The following provides some indication of the United States' Pacific force potency:
- Three aircraft carriers usually are deployed in the Western Pacific. 6 ° Each carrier can launch up to three waves of seventeen to
twenty-one bombers. 6 1 The carriers store nuclear weapons, and the
62
carrier strike aircraft are nuclear capable.
- Ten Ohio-class submarines will be deployed in the Pacific by
1989.63 Each carries twenty-four Trident I missiles and is able to fire
192 nuclear warheads to within 500 yards of their target up to a range
of 4,500 miles. 64 These submarines eventually will be equipped with
65
the even more lethal Trident II missile.
- Thirty-eight Los Angeles-class and converted Polaris submarines are armed with nuclear missiles and torpedoes and are responsi66
ble for attacking Soviet submarines.
67
- Deploying up to 400 sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles
will increase the number of ships capable of launching a nuclear at-

tack from five to fifty by

1990.68

58. Id. at 135.
59. Id. at 153, 162. "The U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet is divided into.., the [Seventh] Fleet,
which cruises the West Pacific and Indian Ocean; and the [Third] Fleet, which operates in the
East Pacific along the broad littoral of North and South America." Id. at 158.
60. Id. at 163.
61. Id. at 164.
62. Id.
63. Zarsky, Hayes & Bello, Brinksmanship in the Pacific, 5 NUCLEAR TIMES 17 (May/
June 1987).

64.

Id.

65.
66.

Id.
P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W. BELLO, supra note 9, at 220.

67.

Id. at 264.

68. Zarsky, Hayes & Bello, supra note 63, at 17. Sea launched cruise missiles, referred to
as Tomahawks, are torpedo-shaped, low-flying bombs powered by turbofan engines. "The
Tomahawk reaches subsonic speeds of 550 miles per hour and carries onboard computers ...
which can place the weapon within one hundred yards of target from a distance of fifteen
hundred miles." The conventional Tomahawk "carries a one-thousand-pound warhead, while
the nuclear version has a two hundred-kiloton warhead (with an explosive power fifteen times
that of the Hiroshima bomb)."

M. BEDFORD, THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF U.S. DEPLOYMENTS
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- "Twenty B-52G nuclear bombers of the 43rd Strategic Wing
are based at Anderson Air Force Base in Guam. ' 69 Each is armed
with from four to eight short-range nuclear attack missiles and four
big gravity bombs. 70 Between 216 and 264 additional land-based aircraft are stationed in the Western Pacific and are capable of being
equipped with nuclear bombs that are stored in Guam, Alaska or
Hawaii. 71
- The Pacific contains a vast communications network based on
satellites and on land-based communication and detection stations.
This network provides a link to United States ships and planes,
monitors Soviet satellites and communication systems, and provides
an early warning system in the event of a Soviet attack. 72 Northwest
Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar in Australia are particularly vital,
and would be targeted in the event of a nuclear exchange. 73
Soviet Pacific nuclear forces also have expanded. 74 The Soviets
deployed approximately 115 submarine-launched ballistic missiles,
50-60 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, and 240 anti-submarine warfare
depth charges and rockets, surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship cruise
missiles. 75 This nuclear force includes:
- "Two Yankee-class submarines carrying SS-N-6 ballistic missiles with a firing range of 3,000 [kilometers]. ' ' 76 These submarines
normally sail in the Pacific and one remains within firing range of the
United States. 77 Twelve Delta-class submarines carrying SS-N-8 missiles capable of hitting the United States from 9,000 kilometers remain in port or venture into the Japan or Okhotsk Seas. 78 Nine old
Golf II and Hotel II-class ballistic submarines sail in the Pacific,
IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS,

141, 156, reprinted in

THE DEADLY CONNECTION:

NUCLEAR WAR & U.S. INTERVENTION (J. Gerson ed. 1986).

69.

P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W. BELLO, supra note 9, at 218.

70.

Id.

71.
72.
73.
note 68,

Id. at 172.
Id. at 193, 199, 201, 204; M. BEDFORD, supra note 68, at 154.
P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W. BELLO, supra note 9, at 410; see also M. BEDFORD, supra
at 154.

74. See generally A. COCKBURN, THE THREAT INSIDE THE SOVIET MILITARY MACHINE (1984). However, the United States and its East Asian allies out number the Soviet

Pacific Fleet and North Korea by a 5:1 ratio; displace nearly twice as many tons; and have
more powerful and accurate armaments. The Soviet advantage in landpower may be offset by
China's possible support of the United States in any conflict. P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W.
BELLO, supra, note 9, at 311, 314.
75. P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W. BELLO, supra note 9, at 324.

76.

Id.

77.
78.

Id.
Id.
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equipped with SS-N-5 ballistic missiles with a range of 1,200 kilometers. 79 The Soviets also utilize a fleet of roughly ninety diesel-powered
submarines, armed with anti-ship nuclear cruise missiles and
8

torpedoes . 0
- The Soviet Union surface fleet carries "a small number of nuclear-armed cruise missiles, and an unknown number of nuclear anti'81
submarine depth bombs and torpedoes.
- The bulk of the Soviet nuclear arsenal aimed at the Pacific is
82
comprised of warheads on land-based intermediate-range missiles.
At least 163 mobile SS-20 launchers are positioned in Mongolia and
are able to strike a broad arc encompassing China, the Aleutians and
83
Southeast Asia.
Thus, "[e]nmeshed in superpower politics, the Pacific is suspended in a state of perpetual nuclear terror. Living in the shadow of
"84 A regional nuclear exchange could be prethe nuclear bomb .
cipitated by tensions in Korea, by conflict along the Soviet-Chinese
border, or by a nuclear shoot-out between a United States and a Soviet ship. A Pacific-launched United States attack on Vladivostok
likely would result in a Soviet retaliatory nuclear strike against Guam,
Okinawa, South Korea or other Pacific territories. 85 A Soviet firststrike against Europe or the United States likely would be accompanied by a nuclear assault on Pacific early warning radar in the Aleutians, satellite launch radar in the Philippines, Guam and Marshall
Islands, or against satellite ground stations in Australia, Guam or Japan.86 In a two-day all-out nuclear exchange, it is estimated that approximately 5,200 United States and Soviet weapons would release
roughly 1,100 megatons of nuclear explosives in the Pacific. 87 This is
the equivalent of 87,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs and "would totally
'8 8
destroy the Far East and the Pacific."
79.

Id. at 325.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 327.
83. Id. at 330.
84. Id. at 337.
85. See id. at 346.
86. Id. at 239-41, 351.
87. Id. at 354.
88. Id. The 5,220 estimate is comprised of "2,400 warheads and 435 megatons from the
U.S. arsenal, and 2,800 warheads and 656 megatons from the Soviet arsenal." Id. It is estimated that 500 United States warheads would be sufficient to destroy Soviet sites in Siberia
and the Far East and that 200 to 400 Soviet nuclear warheads would destroy all U.S. forward
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The danger of a nuclear accident also exists. In 1983, over one
third of the visits to Pacific forward ports by United States ships were
by nuclear-powered vessels. 89 While the United States will "neither
confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons or components on
board any ship," virtually all United States warships visiting Pacific
ports are certified to carry nuclear weapons. 90 Accidents may occur
when weapons are shifted between ships or storage depots, 91 or when
92
a warhead mistakenly is dropped.
III.

ANTI-NUCLEARISM IN THE PACIFIC

A.

Political Protest

In reaction to the Pacific's nuclearization, a trans-Pacific "peoples' diplomacy" movement has developed, which is calling for the
region's denuclearization. 93 The movement gained momentum in
1985, when agents of the French intelligence service blew up the
Greenpeace anti-nuclear vessel, the Rainbow Warrior. 94
One of the most controversial developments in the Pacific antinuclear movement is New Zealand's decision to prohibit nucleararmed and nuclear-powered ships from entering its harbors. 95 The
United States has a world-wide policy of refusing either to "confirm
or deny" whether its vessels carry nuclear weapons and as a result, all
United States ships have been excluded from entering New Zealand. 96
In retaliation, New Zealand has been excluded from the Security
Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States
(ANZUS Treaty). 97 The United States appears to fear the spread of
bases in the Pacific. Id. at 355. Both the Soviet and United States Pacific nuclear arsenals are

expected to increase by 50 to 60% by 1990. Id.
89. Id. at 282.
90. Id. at 282-83.
91. Id. at 286-87.
92. Id. at 287. "The U.S. Navy reports that 381 naval-nuclear accidents and incidents
occurred between 1965 and 1977." Id.
93. Id. at 405-06; Zarsky, For a Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific, 95 S.E. ASIA
CHRONICLE 25 (Nov. 1984); Salzman, The Genesis of New Zealand's Ban, 43 BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS 45 (July/Aug. 1987).
94. See generally M. KING, DEATH OF THE RAINBOW WARRIOR (1986); D. ROBIE,
EYES OF FIRE, THE LAST VOYAGE OF THE RAINBOW WARRIOR (1986).
95. See generally Clements, New Zealand Paying for Nuclear Ban, 43 BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS 41 (July/Aug. 1987).
96. Id. at 42.
97. Security Treaty, Sept. 1, 1951, United States-Australia-New Zealand, 3 U.S.T. 3420,
T.I.A.S. No. 2493, [hereinafter ANZUS Treaty]; see generally U.S. - New Zealand Disagreement on Port Access for U.S. Ships, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 87 (Sept. 1986).
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the "kiwi disease. ' ' 98 On June 27, 1986, United States Secretary of
State George Schultz observed:
I'd hate to see the New Zealand policy spread, because it would
basically cripple the ability of the United States and our allies to
defend the values that we and New Zealand and others share ....
And if we don't have nuclear weapons and have the capability to
deter . . . aggression . . . then we subject everybody-including
ourselves-to nuclear blackmail by the Soviet Union. So it would
be a tragedy for freedom and Western values for the policy of New
Zealand to spread. [O]ne of the reasons why we must insist that
our vessels can call on a "no confirmation or deny" basis and not
deviate from that is that if we deviate in one place, we deviate all
over the world instantly. And so we have to have a policy that is
basically consistent, and we do. 99
Despite United States opposition, the Pacific denuclearization
movement has gathered strength, and in 1985, the independent states
of the Pacific Forum declared their region a nuclear free zone.l°° This
step is part of a larger movement to create nuclear-weapon-free zones
throughout the world.

B.

Nuclear-Free-Zones

In 1976, the Conference of the United Nations Committee on
Disarmament published a special report on nuclear-weapon-free
zones. 01 1 The report noted that the dominant factors in the concept of
nuclear-weapon-free zones is the desire to secure the absence of nuclear weapons from various portions of the globe, to spare the nations
involved from the threat of nuclear attack or involvement in nuclear
war, and to contribute to general and complete nuclear disarmament.10 2 The report concluded that nuclear-weapon-free zones must
be considered an "additional means for averting nuclear-weapon
proliferation and halting the nuclear-arms race. [N]uclear-weaponfree zones provide complimentary machinery to other collateral meas98. "Kiwi disease" refers to New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance which the United States
fears may spread to other South Pacific countries. See Fry, supra note 3.
99. Excerpts from Joint News Conference, Manilla, June 27, 1986, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL.
36, 37 (Sept. 1986); see also, U.S. and Australia Hold MinisterialTalks, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL.
43, 46 (Oct. 1986) (remarks of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger).
100. South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3.
101. Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects: Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, U.N. Doc. A/
10027/Add.1, U.N. Sales No. E.76.I.7 (1976).
102. Id. para. 82.

1988]

Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

ures of disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the
development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy."' 0 3
The creation of such zones finds implicit legal support in the
United Nations Charter.1o4 Article 1(1) states that one purpose of the
United Nations is "[t]o maintain international peace and security, and
to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace ....-105 Article 52(1) provides
that:
[n]othing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations. 106
Article 52(3) adds that "[t]he Security Council shall encourage the
development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies .
*...,7 The
creation of regional arrangements specifically to safeguard against
nuclear weapons was recognized in Article VII of the 1968 Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which provides that
"[n]othing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to
conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."'' 0 8
Nuclear-weapon-free zones were endorsed in 1978 in the Final
Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament ("Final Document").l0 9 The instrument sets forth "fundamental principles" to guide negotiations and measures in the field of
disarmament.1 0 Among these principles are that:
(t)he establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of
agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of
103. Id. para. 83.
104. U.N. CHARTER, 1976 U.N.Y.B. 1043.
105. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
106. Id. art. 52, para. 1.
107. Id. para. 3. Such regional arrangements, however, arguably do not abrogate a States'
right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. Id. art. 51.
108. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. VII, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
109. Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament,
G.A.Res. S-10/2, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 4) at para. 60, U.N. Doc. A/S-10/4 (1978),
reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1016 (1978).
110. Id. para. 25.
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the zone concerned, and the full compliance with those agreements
or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free
from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclearweapon States, constitute an important disarmament measure."'

The Final Document's "Programme of Action"" 2 states that "[t]he
process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world
should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world
' 3
entirely free of nuclear weapons." "
The United Nations, in various proposals and resolutions, has
recognized the desirability of states declaring nuclear-weapon-free
zones' 14 in Latin America,1 5 the Middle East, 1' 6 South Asia,' 7 Africa"18 and in the South Pacific. 1 9 The United Nations has called
upon states within each of these zones to enter into treaties or conventions prohibiting all nuclear weapons and providing for an international system of verification. 20 Nuclear weapons states have been
requested to pledge their respect for the integrity of the zones and to
refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against
2
states in the zones.1 '
C.

Existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Various geographic areas already have been internationally recognized as nuclear-weapon-free zones.
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty 22 recognizes in its preamble "that it
is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever
to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the
111. Id. para. 33.
112. Id. art. III.
113. Id. para. 61.
114. See generally Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
19-28, U.N. Doc. A/10027/Add.1, U.N. Sales No. E.76.I.7 (1976); K. COATES, THE MOST
DANGEROUS DECADE 63-77 (1984).
115. G.A. Res. 3262, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974);
G.A. Res. 3473, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
116. G.A. Res. 3263, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974);
G.A. Res. 3474, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
117. G.A. Res. 3265, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974);
G.A. Res. 3476, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
118. G.A. Res. 3471, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 22, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
119. G.A. Res. 3477, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
120. G.A. Res. 3472(B), 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 23, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975).
121. Id.
122. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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scene or object of international discord .... ,,123 Article I(1) provides
that "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall
be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as
the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out
of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons."' 124 Article V(l) bans "[a]ny nuclear explosions in Antarctica
and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shall be
25
prohibited." 1
Outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies, has also been
designated as a nuclear free zone. 126 Article IV of the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty requires that state parties "undertake not to place in
orbit around earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." 27 Celestial bodies including the moon, "shall be used by all
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The
establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the
testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden."' 128
The installation of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean
floor also is prohibited by the 1971 Seabed Treaty. 29 The state
parties:
undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean
floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed
zone . . . any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of

mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or
any other facilities
specifically designed for storing, testing or using
0
13
weapons.
such
The state parties also "undertake not to assist, encourage or induce
any State to carry out [these] activities ...

and not to participate in

123. Id. at preamble.
124. Id. art. 1.
125. Id. art. V(1).
126. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
127. Id. art. IV.
128. Id.
129. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb.
11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
130. Id. art. 1(1).
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any other way in such actions."' 13 1
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) is the model regional nuclear-weaponfree zone treaty. 132 The Treaty obligates twenty-two Latin American
states to limit the "testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons;"' 33 and to
refrain from the "receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any
form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly...
by anyone on their behalf or in any other way."' 134 Further, "[tihe
Contracting Parties also [pledged] to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or
135
control of any nuclear weapon."'
Treaty Protocol I obligates nuclear states "to apply the statute of
denuclearization ...in territories for which, de jure or de facto, they
are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the
geographical zone established in that Treaty."' 36 Treaty Protocol II
obligates contracting nuclear states to respect the Latin American nuclear zone 137 and "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of
38
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America."'
D.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

On August 6, 1985, thirteen independant and self-governing
states in the South Pacific region adopted the South Pacific Nuclear
139
Free Zone Treaty.
The Treaty's preamble recognizes that "the continuing nuclear
131.

Id. art. 1(3).

132. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter Latin America Treaty].
133. Id. art. 1, para. l(a).
134. Id. art. 1, para. l(b).
135. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
136. Additional Protocol I to Latin American Nuclear Weapons Treaty, art. 1, 22 U.S.T.
754, T.I.A.S. No. 10147, 634 U.N.T.S. 360.
137. Additional Protocol II to Latin American Nuclear Weapons Treaty, 22 U.S.T. 754,
T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 364.
138. Id. art. 3.
139. The thirteen states are: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Guinea, New
Zealand, Naru, Niue, Papau New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tavalu, Western Samoa.
Nine states had signed the treaty by Sept. 19, 1985: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji,
Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu and Western Samoa. The South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Introductory Note, 24 I.L.M. 1440 (1985).
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arms race presents the risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all people' ' 14 and that "regional arms control
measures can contribute to global efforts to reverse the nuclear arms
race and promote the national security of each country in the region
and the common security of all .... ,"141 Regional arms control measures also help to ensure "that the bounty and beauty of the land and
sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples and their
1 42
descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace."
Each party to the Treaty undertakes:
(a) not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have
control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere
inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;
(b) not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture
or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device;
(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any
State. 143
Signatory states also undertake not to provide:
fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed
or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:
(i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards of the [1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, which prevents "diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."' 44 ]
or

(ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable
safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy
45

1
Agency (IAEA).

In addition to the above obligations, each signatory state
promises not to station nuclear explosive devices in its territory; 46 not
to test any nuclear explosive device; 14 7 and not "to assist or encourage
140. South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3, at preamble.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. art. 3. These provisions are similar to the Latin America Treaty, supra note 132,
art. 1.
144. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art. III, 21 U.S.T.
483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161; see Latin America Treaty, supra note 132, art. 13.
145. South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4.
146. Id. art. 5(1).
147. Id. art. 6(a).

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 10: 109

the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State."' 14 8
Lastly, the South Pacific Treaty imposes unique obligations on
parties to refrain from dumping "radioactive wastes and other radio149
active matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Free Zone;"'
to prevent the dumping of such material by anyone in its territorial
waters; 150 and not "to assist or encourage the dumping by anyone of
radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere
within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone."'' 1
The Treaty establishes a control system for verifying compliance. 52 This system is comprised of signatory party reports to the
director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (Director) on events arising under or in relation to the Treaty; 15 3 meetings of the Consultative Committee (comprised of government
representatives of signatory states) concerning matters arising in relation to the Treaty and for reviewing its operation; 154 and the previously mentioned state party agreements with the IAEA prohibiting
the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to

nuclear explosive devices. 55

The Treaty also provides a complaints procedure. 156 A state

party that suspects another party is in breach of its treaty obligations
shall bring the complaint to the attention of the party alleged to have
breached the Treaty. 157 If the matter is not resolved, the complainant
may refer it to the Director, requesting that the complaint be brought
to the Consultative Committee's attention. 58 If after considering any
148. Id. art. 6(b). The Latin America Treaty permits explosions of nuclear devices for
"peaceful purposes." Latin America Treaty, supra note 132, art. 18(1).
149. South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3, art. 7(l)(a).
150. Id. art. 7(1)(b).
151. Id. art. 7(l)(c). As anticipated in Article 7(l)(d) the South Pacific Treaty was supplemented by the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of
the South Pacific Region, adopted Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38 (1987) [hereinafter Convention]. Article 11 of the Convention requires parties "to prevent, reduce and control pollution
in the Convention Area resulting from the storage of toxic and hazardous wastes. In particular, the Parties shall prohibit the storage of radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter in
the Convention Area." Id. art. 11. Article 12 provides that "the Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution in the Convention Area which might
result from the testing of nuclear devices." Id. art. 12.
152. South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3, art. 8.
153. Id. art. 9.
154. Id. art. 10; see also id. Annex 3.
155. Id. art. 8(2)(c); see also id. Annex 2.
156. Id. art. 8(2)(d); see also id. Annex 4.
157. Id. Annex 4, para. 1.
158. Id. para. 2.
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explanation offered by the alleged offender, the Consultative Committee decides there is "sufficient substance" in the complaint to warrant
a "special inspection," it shall order an inspection by three "suitably
59
qualified" special inspectors.
The state party against whom the complaint has been lodged
shall provide the special inspectors "full and free access to all information and places within its territory which may be relevant. . ...60
The special inspectors shall report their written conclusions to the
Consultative Committee, which in turn is to report its decision to the
members of the South Pacific Forum. 16 ' The parties shall meet
"promptly" at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum if it is determined that the party complained of is in breach of the Treaty; that the
complaint procedures have not been complied with; or at the request
of either party. 162 No specific sanction is provided in the case of a
63
state party's breach of its treaty obligations.
159. Id. para. 4.
160. Id. para. 6.
161. Id. para. 8.
162. Id. para. 9.
163. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 60(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
32/27 (1969) (done at Vienna, May 22, 1969; opened for signature, May 23, 1969). Article
60(2) states that:
(2) A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation in
whole or in part or to terminate it either:
(i) in relations between themselves and the defaulting State, or
(ii) as between all the parties;
(b) a party specifically affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself
and the defaulting State;
(c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a ground
for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if
the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party
radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance
of its obligations under the treaty.
Id.
Article 60(3) states that:
(3) A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consist in:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
purpose of the treaty.
Id. art. 60(3).
It is interesting that article 13(1) of the South Pacific Treaty states that the "Treaty is of a
permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely." South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3.
Consistent with Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, Article 13(1) provides that "in the event
of a violation by any Party of a provision ... essential to the achievement of the objectives of
the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw
from the Treaty." Id. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving twelve months notice. Id. art.

128
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The South Pacific Treaty is supplemented by three protocols.
Protocol I extends the Treaty to French, United States, and English
territories in the South Pacific. 164 In Protocol II, France, the People's
Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the
United States are requested "not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty or its Protocols by Parties to
them."1 65 Each party to Protocol II further "undertakes not to use or
threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the
Treaty; or [against] (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear
Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol I is
internationally responsible."' 16 6
E.

An Assessment of the Treaty

The South Pacific Treaty goes farther than the Latin American
Treaty in two respects: "it bans so-called peaceful nuclear explosions
as well as explosions concerned with weapons testing; and it bans the
67
dumping of radioactive wastes."''
However, the Treaty's effectiveness in insuring a nuclear-free
South Pacific, is questionable. The prohibition on a signatory state
"in its territory ... stationing ... any nuclear explosive device"' 168 is
qualified by article 5(2) which permits states to allow visits and navigation of its airspace by foreign aircraft and of its territorial seas by
foreign ships and vessels. 169 In 1983, United States' vessels spent 251
13(2). Article 13 is of limited legal utility since a retaliatory withdrawal by a state or states
only will further weaken the Treaty's scope and legitimacy.
164. Id. Protocol I, art. 3.
165. Id. Protocol II, arts. 1, 4.
166. Id. art. 2.
167. Fry, supra note 3, at 62. Article l(c) of the South Pacific Treaty arguably prohibits
explosions for both peaceful and non-peaceful purposes. Article l(c) defines a nuclear explosive device as "any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used." South Pacific Treaty, supra note
3, art. 1(c). Article 6(a) prohibits signatory states from testing "any nuclear explosive device"
within its territory. South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3, art. 6(a).
The Latin America Treaty permits explosions of nuclear devices for "peaceful purposes."
Latin America Treaty, supra note 132, art. 18.
168. South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5(1).
169. Id. art. 5(2). This article states:
Each party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself
whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit
of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea
or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage,
archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.
Id.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/

1988]

Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

ship-days in Australian ports, a substantial proportion of these vessels
were likely armed with nuclear weapons. 170 Australia's continued
policy of permitting visits by United States' ships, in effect, results in a
de facto nuclear presence in that country.
Yet, Australia and New Zealand's legal authority to prohibit the
entry of nuclear armed or powered United States' ships arguably is
constrained by their obligations under the ANZUS Treaty. 7 1 One
author concludes that "[t]he implementation and development of the
ANZUS alliance to the present day indicate that the assurance of unconditional access for U.S. nuclear ships to Australian and New Zea1 72
land ports has generally constituted part of the Treaty's function.'
"Perhaps more important, except for a brief period in the mid-1970's,
the consistent practice of Australia and New Zealand under ANZUS
has been to provide such naval base support for U.S. ships."' 173 Of
course, either country is free to withdraw from the ANZUS Treatya step which both countries concede would weaken regional
74
security. 1
The South Pacific Treaty and its Protocols shall apply to terriCONF. 62/122 [hereinafter UNCLOS III] reprintedin K.

SIMMONDS, U.N. CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA (1983), guarantees the right of innocent passage through territorial

waters. Id. art. 17. The right of innocent passage does not include entering internal waters or
calling at a port facility. Id. art. 18.
The right of innocent passage also does not include passage which is "prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State." Id. art. 19(1). Such non-innocent passage
includes "any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind." Id. art. 19(b); see also id. art.
19(f). It is non-innocent passage by nuclear powered and armed ships that Article 19(2) arguably recognizes implicitly as remaining within the sovereign discretion of signatory states.
170. See generally P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W. BELLO, supra note 9, at 432-433. A total
of forty ship-days were spent in the ports of other Southwest Pacific States. Id.
171. ANZUS Treaty, supra note 97.
172. Comment, The Incompatibility of ANZUS and a Nuclear-FreeNew Zealand, 26 VA.
J. INT'L L. 455, 473 (1986). But see Glover, Is A Nuclear-FreeANZUS Possible? 2 CANTERBURY L. REV. 328 (1985); McLachlan, ANZUS.- The Treaty Reappraised, 1985 N.Z.L.J. 271
(1985).
The argument that Australia and New Zealand are obligated to provide port-access to
United States nuclear-powered and nuclear armed vessels primarily is based on the language of
Article II of the ANZUS Treaty. Article II reads as follows:
"In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately
and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." ANZUS Treaty, supra
note 97, art. II.
173. Comment, supra note 172, at 472.
174. The United States, of course, has stated that it considers New Zealand's limited port
access policy to constitute a de facto withdrawl from the ANZUS Treaty. 86 DEP'T ST.
BULL., supra note 98. New Zealand disputes this claim. McLachlan, supra note 172, at 279.
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tory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. 75 Article 2(2) emphasizes that "nothing in th[e] Treaty shall prejudice or in any way
affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas."' 76 Although the
Treaty's area of legal application is limited to the territory of signatory states in the South Pacific, the Treaty's geographic scope as set
forth in Treaty Annex 1177 purportedly stretches:
from the border of the Latin American nuclear weapons-free zone
in the east to the west coast of Australia in the west, and from the
border of the Antarctic zone in the south to the equator-with
some extension into the northern hemisphere to include Kiribatiin the north. This includes a vast area of ocean over which the
treaty signatoriesdo not have jurisdiction, and in relation to which
78
the treaty does not seek to apply any nuclear prohibitions.
The preamble to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law Of The Sea (UNCLOS) recognizes "the desirability of establishing ... a legal order for the seas and oceans . . . ,",179 and aspires to
"contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, co-operation and
friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the principles
of justice and equal rights ... .,"180 UNCLOS III, however, does not
explicitly limit the ocean transit of military vessels.
Freedom of the high seas1 8' which, inter alia, includes freedom of
navigation 82 and freedom of overflight 83 is guaranteed to all
states. 84 Thus, "[n]o State may validly purport to subject any part of
' 85
the high seas to its sovereignty."'
186
Although the high seas are "reserved for peaceful purposes,"'
Article 95 states that "[w]arships on the high seas have complete immunity from jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State," suggesting that the transit on the high seas of [nuclear] armed vessels is
175. South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2(1).
176. Id. art. 2(2).
177. Id. art. I(a), Annex 1.
178. Fry, supra note 3, at 63 (emphasis added).
179. UNCLOS III, supra note 169, at preamble.
180. Id.
181. Id. art. 87. The high seas are defined as "all parts of the sea that are not included in
the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State." Id. art.
86.
182. Id. art. 87(a).
183. Id. art. 87(b).
184. See id. art. 89.
185. Id.
186. Id. art. 88.
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not prohibited. 8 7 In contrast, UNCLOS III is explicit in prohibiting
the transportation of slaves,18 8 piracy' 8 9 and illicit narcotics traffic' 90
on the high seas.
UNCLOS III does permit each state to establish an Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ).' 9' This Zone "shall not extend beyond 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.' 92 The coastal state has sovereign rights
within the EEZ "for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources" of the waters, seabed and subsoil. 93 All states, however, enjoy the same freedoms of navigation
194
and overflight that they do within the high seas.
Thus, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone legally cannot extend
beyond each State's territorial waters. Yet, "[e]xperts have noted that
the [NWFZ] must extend beyond the territorial seas of the Parties to
have any effect at all, since nuclear-armed warships seldom pass
through territorial waters. Their passage is mainly conducted beyond
the territorial waters, in the ocean space traditionally known as the
'high seas'."'' 95 The "concept of region, then, termed a 'picture frame'
approach, represents an intended area of application .... The extension of the frame to include high seas over which the treaty has no
legal jurisdiction in order that the zone might abut... existing zones
196
is essentially a political exercise."'
The Treaty's effectiveness in creating a nuclear-free Pacific also is
limited by the opposition of some nuclear states. Both France 97 and
the United States'9 8 have declined to sign the Treaty Protocols. On
187. Id. art. 95. An argument might be made that nuclear weapons are illegal and that
nuclear-armed ships fall outside of the scope of Article 95. See generally Lippman, Nuclear
Weapons and InternationalLaw: Towards a Declarationon the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Nuclear Humancide, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 183 (1986).
188. UNCLOS III, supra note 169, art. 99.
189. Id. arts. 100-07.
190. Id. art. 108.
191. Id. art. 55. "The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea ... under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights
and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention." Id.
192. Id. art. 57.

193. Id. art. 56(1)(a).
194. Id. art. 58.
195. Comment, The South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone, the Law of the Sea, and the
ANZUS Alliance: an Exploration of Conflicts, a Step Toward World Peace, 16 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 138, 169 (1986).
196. Fry, supra note 3, at 63.

197. See generally Chesneaux, supra note 3.
198.
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February 5, 1987, the United States announced that "in view of our
global security interests and responsibilities, we are not, under current
circumstances, in a position to sign the protocols. ' ' 99 Opposition by
France, the United States, and possibly Great Britian,2° will exclude
from the scope of the Treaty such territories as French Polynesia,
British Pitcairn Island, and United States' territories in Samoa and
the four entities formerly comprising the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific. 20 1 In addition, United States' nuclear weapons, in
all likelihood, are stored or are on vessels or aircraft in Hawaii,
Guam, the Phillipines and Diego Garcia, all of which border the
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. 20 2 Any nuclear conflict in the Pacific will likely involve these bases and spill over into the Southwest
Pacific.
Further, the Treaty permits (or does not explicitly prohibit) the
involvement of signatory states with nuclear weapons-related missile
testing, 20 3 the stationing of nuclear weapons-related communication
and surveillance facilities, 2° and the sale of uranium, which is a major
Australian export. 20 5 Designating the South Pacific as a "nuclear free
zone" (as opposed to a "nuclear-weapons-free zone") is also misleading since energy, biomedical and research applications of nuclear
power are not prohibited, 20 6 and radioactive material may be stored so
long as it is not converted to "non-peaceful purposes" 20 7 or dumped
at sea within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. 20 8
Thus, the integrity of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone is
threatened by permitting signatory states to grant port access and passage within its territorial waters to nuclear-powered and armed vessels, 20 9 the internationally recognized rights of transit on the high
199. Id. But see Soviet Gains a South Pacific Toehold, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1987, at 6, col.
3. China also has expressed support for the Treaty. Fry, supra note 3, at 66.
200. Fry, supra note 3, at 66.
201. Id.
202. See generally M. BEDFORD, supra note 68.
203. South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3, art. 1(c). A nuclear explosive device "does not
include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not
an indivisible part of it." Id. Australia, for instance, has been considered as a launching point
for United States MX missile tests. P. HAYES, L. ZARSKY & W. BELLO, supra note 9, at 24748.
204. Fry, supra note 3, at 71.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 62.
207. South Pacific Treaty, supra note 3, art. 3.
208. Id. art. 7.
209. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
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seas 210 and through EEZs, 2 1' the refusal of some nuclear powers to
sign and ratify Treaty Protocols, 2 12 and permitting (or not prohibiting) certain nuclear-weapon related activities. 2 13 It also is uncertain
whether the economically and politically weak South Pacific States
will be able to maintain their nuclear free policies and their nuclear
free zone when confronted by pressure exerted by powerful nuclear
states which oppose the Treaty.2 14 The existing qualifications on the
Treaty's provisions and scope, in part, reflect the reluctance of some
Pacific States to antagonize the western nuclear powers. 215
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Pacific is one of the globe's most militarized regions and the
South Pacific Treaty is a strong statement of opposition to nuclear
weapons. Yet, the constraints of international law and politics appear
to prevent the creation of an effective Pacific nuclear free zone and
thus insure that the region will continue to be held hostage by the
nuclear superpowers. Nuclear free zones are comforting political
symbols, but absent global arms control, all countries and peoples remain potential victims of a nuclear holocaust. One dilemma is that
there appears to be no viable alternative to living within the present
system of superpower military dominance. 21 6 Helpless, we cling to
comforting symbols and illusions.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
col. 1.
215.
216.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
generally Crisis Casts Shadow on Fii'sFuture, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1987, at 3,

Fry, supra note 3, at 61-62.
See Lippman, supra note 187, at 185. But see id. 232-34.

